jorkle/Muse-Glimmer-30B-Abliterated
jorkle/Muse-Glimmer-30B-Abliterated is a 29.8 billion parameter language model derived from meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B, specifically engineered to significantly reduce safety refusal rates. It achieves this by removing approximately 87% of safety refusals through a KL-conserving best-of-N steered LoRA SFT, which is then folded into the base weights. This model is intended as a general-purpose assistant with enhanced compliance, maintaining high capability preservation due to its KL-conserving training method. It offers various GGUF quantizations for deployment flexibility.
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Overview
jorkle/Muse-Glimmer-30B-Abliterated is a 29.8 billion parameter model based on meta-models/Muse-Glimmer-30B, designed to address safety refusal behaviors. It significantly reduces refusal rates by approximately 87% compared to its base model, as measured on harmful_behaviors benchmarks (13/100 refusal rate).
Key Capabilities & Features
- Reduced Safety Refusal: Engineered to minimize over-refusal, making it more compliant for a wider range of prompts.
- KL-Conservating Training: Utilizes a KL-conserving best-of-N (BoN) steered LoRA SFT method (
λ_KL = 1.0) to ensure high capability preservation while modifying refusal behavior. The mean KL divergence to the base model is 0.0988, indicating minimal drift. - Efficient Adaptation: The LoRA SFT involved training only 0.10% of the base model's parameters (31.1M trained parameters), resulting in a small adapter footprint.
- Quantized Variants: Available in BF16 (56 GB) and GGUF formats, including Q8_0 (28 GB) and Q4_K_M (16 GB), offering flexibility for deployment on different hardware.
Intended Use Cases
- General-Purpose Assistant: Suitable for applications requiring a general-purpose assistant with a lower propensity for safety-related refusals.
- Compliance-Focused Applications: Ideal for scenarios where a more compliant model response is desired, without significant degradation of core capabilities.
Limitations
- No Benchmarks: The model was not evaluated on standard benchmarks (e.g., MMLU, HumanEval) by request; capability preservation is inferred from the KL-conserving training.
- Domain-Specific Refusal: While generally reduced, some specific malicious-sounding prompts in cyber/hacking domains were still refused, even when
should_refuse=False.